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The Attention-Information Trade-Off

Author

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  • Marta Serra-Garcia

Abstract

How does information transmission change when it requires attracting the attention of receivers? This paper combines an experiment that varies freelance professionals' incentives to attract attention about scientific findings, with several online experiments that exogenously expose receivers to the content created. Attention incentives lead to significantly less information being transmitted, but not more factually inaccurate content. These incentives increase information demand and the knowledge of interested receivers. However, among the majority of receivers who do not demand more information, attention incentives lower knowledge and increase biases in beliefs, revealing a channel through which misperceptions can arise: missing information.

Suggested Citation

  • Marta Serra-Garcia, 2026. "The Attention-Information Trade-Off," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 116(5), pages 1579-1610, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:116:y:2026:i:5:p:1579-1610
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240850
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Thomas Graeber & Shakked Noy & Christopher Roth & Thomas W. Graeber, 2025. "The Transmission of Reliable and Unreliable Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 12109, CESifo.
    3. Martin C. Hänsel & Daniel Spiro, 2025. "Four Questions About the Distributional Effects of Climate Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 12348, CESifo.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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