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Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections

Author

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  • Niall Hughes

Abstract

I study multidistrict legislative elections with two parties and two binary dimensions of policy. Strategic voters focus on the dimension where their district is most likely to be pivotal in the legislature. Anticipating this, candidates select different policies than they would in single-district elections. The final policy is (i) uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (ii) preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension, and (iii) a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are not guaranteed in single-district elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Niall Hughes, 2025. "Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 115(12), pages 4292-4327, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:115:y:2025:i:12:p:4292-4327
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220665
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    2. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2022. "Rewarding conservative politicians? Evidence from voting on same-sex marriage," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 161-172, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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