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Merger Policy with Merger Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Volker Nocke
  • Michael D. Whinston

Abstract

We analyze the optimal policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and firms choose among alternative mergers. In our model, the optimal policy of an antitrust authority that seeks to maximize expected consumer surplus imposes a tougher standard on "larger" mergers, i.e., those involving firms with a larger pre-merger market share. The optimal policy is a response to a bias in firms' proposal incentives: firms always propose a larger merger when it is better for consumers than a smaller one, but sometimes will propose the larger one even when it is worse for consumers.

Suggested Citation

  • Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, 2013. "Merger Policy with Merger Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 1006-1033, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:2:p:1006-33
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.2.1006
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ben Mermelstein & Volker Nocke & Mark A. Satterthwaite & Michael D. Whinston, 2014. "Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies: A Computational Model of Optimal Merger Policy," NBER Working Papers 20051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. MIYAGIWA, Kaz & WAN, Jiangyun(Yunyun), 2015. "The Merger Paradox and R&D," IIR Working Paper 15-21, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. Carletti, Elena & Ongena, Steven & Siedlarek, Jan-Peter & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2015. "The Impact of Merger Legislation on Bank Mergers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 530, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    4. Ghosh, Arghya & Morita, Hodaka & Wang, Chengsi, 2014. "Horizontal mergers in the presence of vertical relationships," Working Papers 14-27, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    5. XiaoGang Che & Brad Humphreys, 2015. "Competition Between Sports Leagues: Theory and Evidence on Rival League Formation in North America," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(2), pages 127-143, March.
    6. Manfred Neumann, 2016. "Efficiency Defense in EU and US Horizontal Merger Control if Costs are Endogenous," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(1), pages 48-60, February.
    7. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Moreno Ruiz, Diego & Manasakis, C. & Cabolis, C., 2016. "R&D investments fostering horizontal mergers," UC3M Working papers. Economics 23280, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    8. Pagnozzi, Marco & Rosato, Antonio, 2016. "Entry by takeover: Auctions vs. bilateral negotiations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 68-84.
    9. Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2017. "Analysis of Merger Control in A Network Products Market," Discussion Paper Series 169, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Nov 2017.
    10. Troya-Martinez, Marta, 2016. "Vagueness and information-sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 301-320.
    11. repec:ura:ecregj:v:1:y:2018:i:2:p:547-561 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Hong Zhu & Qi Zhu, 2016. "Mergers and acquisitions by Chinese firms: A review and comparison with other mergers and acquisitions research in the leading journals," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 1107-1149, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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