IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Non-Conventional Instruments and Supervision of Environmental Policies


  • Dominique Bureau


Instead of pigovian taxes, environmental policies favor targeted subsidies on specific technologies as well as other non-conventional instruments, such as the introduction of green clauses in public procurement. We investigate potential political economy reasons for such a choice of instruments, marked by: use of differentiated and targeted instruments; which cover a limited share of emissions; associated with very high shadow environmental prices in the subsidized sectors; and simultaneous absence, or near-absence, of widespread pricing of nuisances. Within the framework of Maskin-Tirole s model of representative democracy (2004), this type of configuration can arise rationally, as equilibrium of the political decision-making process. The corresponding context is one where decision-makers, highly interested in re-election, are obliged to take long-term environmental challenges into consideration, the public being dependent of the information given by these sectors to understand the policies that are implemented. This suggests different ways to improve the governance of environmental policies. JEL Codes: H23, Q58. Keywords: Pigovian Taxes, Environmental Subsidies, Accountability.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Bureau, 2018. "Non-Conventional Instruments and Supervision of Environmental Policies," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 132, pages 33-51.
  • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2018:i:132:p:33-51
    DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0033

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL:
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item

    More about this item


    Pigovian Taxes; Environmental Subsidies; Accountability.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2018:i:132:p:33-51. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Secretariat General or Laurent Linnemer (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.