IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/adr/anecst/y2001i61p33-39.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rationality and Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining: Comment (1)

Author

Listed:
  • Rosemarie Nagel

Abstract

In his paper "Rationality and Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining", Shmuel ZAMIR presents four different types of variations of repeated ultimatum games (UG) with random matching after each period. The author stresses the close link between game theory and actuel behavior. The main argument of the papal is that, despite the seeming discrepancy between actant behavior and theoretical predictions, rationality, in the sense of "a rational person prefers receiving any positive amount of money to receiving nothing", is present in the data. However, he does not deny that some part cannot be explained by even short term maximization but rather by other motives. He concludes that we need a model that contains a "richer interpretation of the notion of rationality". In my discussion, I will focus on three issues, some of which are also discussed by ZAMIR, relevant to bridging the gap between the theory and the empirical findings. These issues are choosing the appropriate design, incorporating fairness into a descriptive modal, and analyzing the data in terms of learning in order to disentangle strategic or rational features from emotional or other motives. ZAMIR's paper is an outstanding representation of a variety of experiments within the framework of ultimatum games. These variations exhibit a rich amount of observed and theoretical aspects that is currently discussed in the experimental literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosemarie Nagel, 2001. "Rationality and Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining: Comment (1)," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 61, pages 33-39.
  • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:61:p:33-39
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076267
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mikhael Shor, 2008. "An experiment on strategic capacity reduction," Working papers 2012-22, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:61:p:33-39. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Secretariat General or Laurent Linnemer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ensaefr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.