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Withholding of Information as an Endogenous Entry Barrier

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  • Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz
  • Jesus Rubio

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the withholding of information from an agent by a principal for fear that the agent may set up his own business if he is informed. We focus on two points when studying this question: the power of the principal to control the information available to the agent, and the possibility that the agent may set up a new firm if he receives private information.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz & Jesus Rubio, 2000. "Withholding of Information as an Endogenous Entry Barrier," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 58, pages 185-194.
  • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2000:i:58:p:185-194
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    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076232
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    Cited by:

    1. Kwiatkowski, Andrzej, 2010. "Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-87, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).

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