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Rationnement, anticipations rationnelles et équilibres de Stackelberg

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  • Marcel Boyer
  • Michel Moreaux

Abstract

We consider a Stackelberg like duopoly in which the strategy space of the firms are price-quantity pairs, meaning that, at this price, a firm is willing to sell at most the supplied quantity. It is shown that, at the equilibrium, the leader will quote a price lower than the price quoted by the follower, and that, at the price he quotes, he will ration his demand. Hence we get a market structure in which price rigidities and persistent excess demand are immediate outcomes of the non-competitive behiavior of some agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer & Michel Moreaux, 1986. "Rationnement, anticipations rationnelles et équilibres de Stackelberg," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 1, pages 55-73.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1986:i:1:p:55-73
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