Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms

Citations

Cited by:

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   • Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi Li, 2019. "Relational Communication," Papers 1901.05645, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
4. Ran Canetti & Amos Fiat & Yannai A. Gonczarowski, 2023. "Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms," Papers 2302.05590, arXiv.org.
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6. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022. "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 79-85.
7. Hendricks, Ken & Wiseman, Thomas, 2022. "How to sell in a sequential auction market," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
8. Andreas Haupt & Zoe Hitzig, 2023. "Opaque Contracts," Papers 2301.13404, arXiv.org.
9. Martino Banchio & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2022. "Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design," Papers 2202.05947, arXiv.org.
10. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li, 2020. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 425-467, March.
11. Skreta, Vasiliki & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Purchase history and product personalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 15969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2021. "Purchase history and product personalization," Papers 2103.11504, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
12. Bos, Olivier & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Optimal auctions with signaling bidders," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-091, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Oliver Bos & Martin Pollrich, 2020. "Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_158, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
13. Miltiadis Makris & Ludovic Renou, 2018. "Information design in multi-stage games," Working Papers 861, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    • Miltiadis Makris & Ludovic Renou, 2021. "Information Design in Multi-stage Games," Papers 2102.13482, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
14. Moshe Babaioff & Nicole Immorlica & Yingkai Li & Brendan Lucier, 2021. "Making Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets," Papers 2107.05853, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
15. Bergemann, Dirk & Ottaviani, Marco, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," CEPR Discussion Papers 16459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Dirk Bergemann & Marco Ottaviani, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2296, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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17. Wang, Dazhong & Xu, Xinyi & Zeng, Xianjie, 2023. "Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
18. Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022. "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
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21. Andreas A. Haupt & Nicole Immorlica & Brendan Lucier, 2023. "Certification Design for a Competitive Market," Papers 2301.13449, arXiv.org.
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24. Kenneth Hendricks & Thomas Wiseman, 2021. "How To Sell (or Procure) in a Sequential Auction," Papers 2110.13121, arXiv.org.
25. Cho, Myeonghwan & Song, Joon, 2022. "Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
26. Martino Banchio & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2022. "Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of Artificial Intelligence, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Martino Banchio & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2022. "Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design," Papers 2202.05947, arXiv.org.