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Super-Experienced Bidders In First-Price Common-Value Auctions: Rules Of Thumb, Nash Equilibrium Bidding, And The Winner'S Curse

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Weili Ding & Steven F. Lehrer, 2000. "Using Performance Incentives to Reward the Value Added by Educators: Theory and Evidence from China," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1519, Econometric Society.
  2. Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 694-711, September.
  3. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1721-1770, November.
  4. Fiala, Nathan, 2014. "Skills in the Marketplace: Market Equilibrium, Personality and Ability in a Field-Based Experiment," Working Papers 30, University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
  5. Cox, Caleb & Davis, Douglas & Korenok, Oleg & Lightle, John, 2023. "Stress tests and information disclosure: An experimental analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
  6. John H. Kagel & Colin M. Campbell & Dan Levin, 1999. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 325-334, March.
  7. Nathan Fiala, 2013. "Skills in the Marketplace: Individual Characteristics and Bargaining Ability in a Field-Based Experiment," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1326, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  8. Marco Casari & John C. Ham & John H. Kagel, 2007. "Selection Bias, Demographic Effects, and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1278-1304, September.
  9. Dan Levin & James Peck & Asen Ivanov, 2016. "Separating Bayesian Updating from Non-Probabilistic Reasoning: An Experimental Investigation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 39-60, May.
  10. Fiala, Nathan, 2015. "Skills in the marketplace: Market efficiency, social orientation, and ability in a field-based experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 174-188.
  11. Grosskopf, Brit & Rentschler, Lucas & Sarin, Rajiv, 2018. "An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 40-64.
  12. Wei-Shiun Chang & Timothy C. Salmon & Krista J. Saral, 2016. "Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation And Wealth Constraints," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1684-1704, July.
  13. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2012. "Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 217(3), pages 653-663.
  14. Brünner, Tobias & Becker, Alice, 2013. "Bidding in common value fair division games," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79810, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  15. Carl R. Gwin & Seow-Eng Ong & Andrew C. Spieler, 2005. "Auctions and Land Values: An Experimental Analysis," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 42(12), pages 2245-2259, November.
  16. Johanna Goertz, 2012. "Market composition and experience in common-value auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(1), pages 106-127, March.
  17. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
  18. repec:cup:judgdm:v:3:y:2008:i:7:p:483-492 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Ham, John C. & Kagel, John H. & Lehrer, Steven F., 2005. "Randomization, endogeneity and laboratory experiments: the role of cash balances in private value auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 125(1-2), pages 175-205.
  20. Wouter van den Bos & Jian Li & Tatiana Lau & Eric Maskin & Jonathan D. Cohen & P. Read Montague & Samuel M. McClure, 2008. "The value of victory: social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 3(7), pages 483-492, October.
  21. Mares Vlad & Shor Mikhael, 2012. "On the Competitive Effects of Bidding Syndicates," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-33, September.
  22. Panos L. Lorentziadis, 2020. "Value-Rationalizability in Auction Bidding," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 1-13, June.
  23. Richard, Jean-François, 2000. "Conférence François-Albert Angers (1999). Enchères : théorie économique et réalité," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 76(2), pages 173-198, juin.
  24. Daniel Montanera & Abhay Nath Mishra & T. S. Raghu, 2022. "Mitigating Risk Selection in Healthcare Entitlement Programs: A Beneficiary-Level Competitive Bidding Approach," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1221-1247, December.
  25. John C. Ham & Steven F. Lehrer, 2020. "Instrumental variables estimation of a simple dynamic model of bidding behavior in private value auctions," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(2), pages 139-155, December.
  26. Wei-Shiun Chang & Bo Chen & Timothy C. Salmon, 2015. "An Investigation of the Average Bid Mechanism for Procurement Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(6), pages 1237-1254, June.
  27. Dan Levin & James Peck & Asen Ivanov, 2016. "Separating Bayesian Updating from Non-Probabilistic Reasoning: An Experimental Investigation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 39-60, May.
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