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Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Kyung Hwan Baik & In‐Gyu Kim, 2007. "Strategic Decisions On Lawyers’ Compensation In Civil Disputes," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 854-863, October.
  2. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 379-385.
  3. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  4. Leshem Shmuel, 2009. "Contingent Fees, Signaling and Settlement Authority," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 435-460, June.
  5. Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude, 2016. "Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 16-23.
  6. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2014. "On discovery, restricting lawyers, and the settlement rate," DICE Discussion Papers 155, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  7. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil & Tzavara, Dionisia, 2004. "Legal expenses insurance, risk aversion and litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-119, March.
  8. Bradley Graham & Jack Robles, 2014. "Moral hazard and legal services contracts," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(3), pages 219-230, September.
  9. Winand Emons, 2007. "Conditional versus contingent fees," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January.
  10. Nathan Berg & Jeong‐Yoo Kim & Ilgyun Seon, 2021. "A performance‐based payment: Signaling the quality of a credence good," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(5), pages 1117-1131, July.
  11. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 5(1), pages 165-188.
  12. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2015. "Self-regulation of the legal profession and quality in the market for legal services: an economic analysis of lawyers’ reputation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 431-449, April.
  13. Andrew F. Daughtey & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2010. "Clients, Lawyers, Second Opinions, and Agency," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1009, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  14. Zhou, J., 2010. "Access to justice : An economic approach," Other publications TiSEM 9d70f451-35c4-4878-92bf-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  15. Gabuthy, Yannick & Peterle, Emmanuel & Tisserand, Jean-Christian, 2021. "Legal Fees, Cost-Shifting Rules and Litigation: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
  16. Kyung Hwan Baik, 2007. "Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(4), pages 986-1002, April.
  17. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2015. "An attorney fee as a signal in pretrial negotiation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(1), pages 75-102, January.
  18. Henderson, James & Leleux, Benoit & White, Ian, 2006. "Service-for-equity arrangements: Untangling motives and conflicts," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 886-909, November.
  19. Frank H. Stephen, 2013. "Lawyers, Markets and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14803.
  20. Holger Sieg, 2000. "Estimating a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Disputes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 1006-1021, October.
  21. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2010. "Déréglementer la profession d’avocat ? Les apories de l’analyse économique," Working Papers hal-04140922, HAL.
  22. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
  23. Jorge Lemus & Emil Temnyalov & John L. Turner, 2021. "Liability Insurance: Equilibrium Contracts under Monopoly and Competition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 83-115, February.
  24. Rudy Santore & Alan D. Viard, 1999. "Legal fee restrictions, moral hazard, and attorney profits," Working Papers 9912, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  25. Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Contingent fees and litigation settlement1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 295-317, September.
  26. Guillaume Roels & Uday S. Karmarkar & Scott Carr, 2010. "Contracting for Collaborative Services," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(5), pages 849-863, May.
  27. Brad Graham & Jack Robles, 2019. "Attorney fees in repeated relationships," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 127(2), pages 99-124, July.
  28. Nakao Keisuke & Tsumagari Masatoshi, 2012. "The Inquisitor Judge's Trilemma," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 137-159, May.
  29. Zamir Eyal & Medina Barak & Segal Uzi, 2014. "Who Benefits from the Uniformity of Contingent Fee Rates?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 357-387, January.
  30. Halla, Martin, 2007. "Divorce and the Excess Burden of Lawyers," IZA Discussion Papers 2962, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  31. Friehe, Tim, 2010. "Contingent fees and legal expenses insurance: Comparison for varying defendant fault," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 283-290, December.
  32. Amy Fanner & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Dispute Rates and Contingency Fees: An Analysis from the Signaling Model," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(3), pages 566-581, January.
  33. Antill, Samuel & Grenadier, Steven R., 2023. "Financing the litigation arms race," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(2), pages 218-234.
  34. Cotten, Stephen J. & Santore, Rudy, 2012. "Contingent fee caps, screening, and the quality of legal services," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 317-328.
  35. Virginia Rosales & Dolores Jiménez-Rubio, 2017. "Empirical analysis of civil litigation determinants: The Case of Spain," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 321-338, October.
  36. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2012. "Contingent fees meet the British rule: an exploratory study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 499-510, March.
  37. At, Christian & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2015. "Moral hazard and agency relationship in sequential litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 86-90.
  38. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2013. "The regulation of quality in the market for legal services: Taking the heterogeneity of legal services seriously," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 10(2), pages 267-291, August.
  39. Baik Kyung Hwan, 2008. "Attorneys' Compensation in Litigation with Bilateral Delegation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 259-289, August.
  40. Finkle Aaron & Shin Dongsoo, 2010. "Disregarding the Attorney's Advice: An Agency Perspective," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 197-217, September.
  41. Flóra Felső & Sander Onderstal & Jo Seldeslachts, 2022. "The Pricing Structure of Legal Services: Do Lawyers Offer What Clients Want?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(2), pages 123-148, September.
  42. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  43. Raphael Zingg & Erasmus Elsner, 2020. "Protection heterogeneity in a harmonized European patent system," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 87-131, August.
  44. Brad Graham & Jack Robles, 2019. "Attorney fees in repeated relationships," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 127(2), pages 99-124, July.
  45. Deffains, Bruno & Desrieux, Claudine, 2015. "To litigate or not to litigate? The impacts of third-party financing on litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 178-189.
  46. Hyde, Charles E., 2006. "Conditional versus contingent fees: Litigation expenditure incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 180-194, June.
  47. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Litigation and the Legal Process," NBER Working Papers 9697, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  48. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2011. "Search, Bargaining, And Agency in the Market for Legal Services," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1106, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
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