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Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis

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Author Info
Daniel F. Rubinfeld
Suzanne Scotchmer

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Abstract

When there is asymmetric information, contingent fees can allow clients to signal the qualities of their cases and attorneys to signal the quality of their advice. Thus, a well-informed client who has a high-quality case will be willing to pay a relatively high fixed fee and a relatively low contingency percentage, while a client with a low-quality case will prefer a low fixed fee and a high contingency percentage. In contrast, a well-informed high-quality attorney will signal her ability by working for a relatively high contingency percentage.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 24 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 343-356
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:24:y:1993:i:autumn:p:343-356

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  1. Martin Halla, 2007. "Divorce and the Excess Burden of Lawyers," Economics working papers 2007-13, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, 2001. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1023, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 379-385. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rudy Santore & Alan D. Viard, 1999. "Legal fee restrictions, moral hazard, and attorney profits," Working Papers 99-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
  6. Winand Emons, 2004. "Conditional versus Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0409, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the Hour: Why Large Law Firms Prefer Hourly Fees Over Contingent Fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  8. Péter Eso & Balázs Szentes, 2004. "The Price of Advice," Discussion Papers 1416, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Douglas Cumming, 2001. "Settlement Disputes: Evidence from a Legal Practice Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 249-280, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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