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Delay and deadlines: freeriding and information revelation in partnerships

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2015. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113046, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  2. Alessandro Bonatti & Heikki Rantakari, 2016. "The Politics of Compromise," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 229-259, February.
  3. Aghamolla, Cyrus & Hashimoto, Tadashi, 2020. "Information arrival, delay, and clustering in financial markets with dynamic freeriding," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 27-52.
  4. Swank, Otto H. & Visser, Bauke, 2023. "Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
  5. Altmann, Steffen & Traxler, Christian & Weinschenk, Philipp, 2017. "Deadlines and Cognitive Limitations," IZA Discussion Papers 11129, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  6. Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2014. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-533, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  7. Chia‐Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2018. "Dynamic performance evaluation with deadlines: The role of commitment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 377-422, June.
  8. Cetemen, Doruk & Hwang, Ilwoo & Kaya, Ayça, 2020. "Uncertainty-driven cooperation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
  9. Bhattacharjee, Swagata, 2022. "Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 534-552.
  10. Nana Adrian & Marc Möller, 2020. "Self‐managed work teams: An efficiency‐rationale for pay compression," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 315-334, April.
  11. Joyee Deb & Aniko Oery & Kevin R. Williams, 2018. "Aiming for the Goal: Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2149R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2021.
  12. Sofia Moroni, 2016. "Experimentation in Organizations," Working Paper 5876, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
  13. Juanjuan Zhang, 2016. "Deadlines in Product Development," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(11), pages 3310-3326, November.
  14. Yair Antler & Daniel Bird & Santiago Oliveros, 2023. "Sequential Learning," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 399-433, February.
  15. Gordon, Sidartha & Marlats, Chantal & Ménager, Lucie, 2021. "Observation delays in teams and effort cycles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 276-298.
  16. Vidal, Jordi Blanes I & Möller, Marc, 2016. "Team adaptation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66439, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  17. Dietrichson, Jens & Gudmundsson, Jens & Jochem, Torsten, 2022. "Why don’t we talk about it? Communication and coordination in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 257-278.
  18. Sofia Moroni, 2019. "Experimentation in Organizations," Working Paper 6631, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
  19. Gregorio Curello, 2021. "Incentives for Collective Innovation," Papers 2109.01885, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
  20. Gomes, Renato & Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas, 2016. "Experimentation and project selection: Screening and learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 145-169.
  21. Nana Adrian & Marc M ller, 2019. "Partnerships with Asymmetric Information: The Benefit of Sharing Equally amongst Unequals," Diskussionsschriften dp1904, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  22. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2015. "A Tenure-Clock Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0919, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  23. Swank, Otto H. & Visser, Bauke, 2023. "Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
  24. Xiang Yu & Yuchong Zhang & Zhou Zhou, 2020. "Teamwise Mean Field Competitions," Papers 2006.14472, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
  25. Yu, Zhixian, 2022. "Contribution games with asymmetric agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
  26. Jochen Schlapp & Nektarios Oraiopoulos & Vincent Mak, 2015. "Resource Allocation Decisions Under Imperfect Evaluation and Organizational Dynamics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(9), pages 2139-2159, September.
  27. Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Shen, Yao & Xie, Jing, 2023. "Innovation beyond firm boundaries: Strategic alliances and corporate innovation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
  28. Steffen Altmann & Christian Traxler & Philipp Weinschenk, 2022. "Deadlines and Memory Limitations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(9), pages 6733-6750, September.
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