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Coordination with flexible information acquisition

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Weijie Zhong, 2018. "The Indirect Cost of Information," Papers 1809.00697, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2020.
  2. Federico Echenique & Anqi Li, 2022. "Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps," Papers 2212.08219, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
  3. Matějka, Filip, 2015. "Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 656-678.
  4. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2018. "Signaling with costly acquisition of signals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 141-150.
  5. Bartosz Maćkowiak & Filip Matějka & Mirko Wiederholt, 2023. "Rational Inattention: A Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 226-273, March.
  6. Baek, Seungjun, 2022. "Optimal policy in lemon markets with flexible information acquisition," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
  7. Li Hu & Anqi Li, 2018. "The Politics of Attention," Papers 1810.11449, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2019.
  8. Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
  9. Baek, Seungjun, 2022. "Information acquisition and asset price volatility," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(PA).
  10. Doron Ravid, 2020. "Ultimatum Bargaining with Rational Inattention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(9), pages 2948-2963, September.
  11. Mensch, Jeffrey, 2021. "Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
  12. Xu Jiang, 2016. "Biases in Accounting and Nonaccounting Information: Substitutes or Complements?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(5), pages 1297-1330, December.
  13. Kwiek, Maksymilian, 2020. "Communication via intermediaries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 190-203.
  14. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020. "Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
  15. Benjamin Hébert & Michael Woodford, 2021. "Neighborhood-Based Information Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3225-3255, October.
  16. Asriyan, Vladimir & Foarta, Dana & Vanasco, Victoria, 2018. "Strategic Complexity When Seeking Approval," Research Papers 3615, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  17. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
  18. SangMok Lee, 2022. "Preference Learning in School Choice Problems," Papers 2202.08366, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
  19. Jinzhi Lu, 2022. "Limited Attention: Implications for Financial Reporting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(5), pages 1991-2027, December.
  20. Szkup, Michal & Trevino, Isabel, 2015. "Information acquisition in global games of regime change," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 387-428.
  21. Hebert, Benjamin & Woodford, Michael, 2018. "Information Costs and Sequential Information Sampling," Research Papers 3751, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  22. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination," NBER Working Papers 22297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Tommaso Denti & Doron Ravid, 2023. "Robust Predictions in Games with Rational Inattention," Papers 2306.09964, arXiv.org.
  24. Flynn, Joel P. & Sastry, Karthik A., 2023. "Strategic mistakes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  25. König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
  26. Friedman, Evan, 2020. "Endogenous quantal response equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 620-643.
  27. Pavan, Alessandro & Vives, Xavier, 2015. "Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 407-426.
  28. Matějka, Filip & Mackowiak, Bartosz & Wiederholt, Mirko, 2018. "Survey: Rational Inattention, a Disciplined Behavioral Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 13243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  29. Rigos, Alexandros, 2022. "The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  30. Szkup, Michal & Trevino, Isabel, 2020. "Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 534-553.
  31. Cai, Zhifeng & Dong, Feng, 2023. "Public disclosure and private information acquisition: A global game approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
  32. Takashi Ui, 2022. "Impacts of Public Information on Flexible Information Acquisition," Papers 2204.09250, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
  33. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2020_014 is not listed on IDEAS
  34. Denti, Tommaso, 2023. "Unrestricted information acquisition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
  35. Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2023. "The Good, the Bad, and the Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 187-226, May.
  36. Annie Liang & Xiaosheng Mu & Vasilis Syrgkanis, 2022. "Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 47-80, January.
  37. Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022. "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-281.
  38. Tommaso Denti & Massimo Marinacci & Luigi Montrucchio, 2020. "A note on rational inattention and rate distortion theory," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 43(1), pages 75-89, June.
  39. Pathikrit Basu & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tetsuya Hoshino & Omer Tamuz, 2018. "Repeated Coordination with Private Learning," Papers 1809.00051, arXiv.org.
  40. Rongyu Wang, 2023. "Bayesian Games with Rationally Inattentive Players," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 35(2), pages 139-171, July.
  41. Fu, Wentao & Sun, Yang, 2021. "Rumor investigation in networks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 168-178.
  42. Benjamin Hébert & Michael Woodford, 2017. "Rational Inattention and Sequential Information Sampling," NBER Working Papers 23787, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  43. König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
  44. Annie Liang & Xiaosheng Mu & Vasilis Syrgkanis, 2021. "Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information," Working Papers 2021-43, Princeton University. Economics Department..
  45. Luo, Shaowen & Villar, Daniel, 2021. "The price adjustment hazard function: Evidence from high inflation periods," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
  46. Annie Liang & Xiaosheng Mu & Vasilis Syrgkanis, 2019. "Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information," Papers 1910.07015, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
  47. Jangho Yang, 2018. "Information Theoretic Approaches In Economics," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3), pages 940-960, July.
  48. Jiang, Xu & Yang, Ming, 2017. "Properties of optimal accounting rules in a signaling game," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 499-512.
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