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Rational Inattention and Sequential Information Sampling

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  • Benjamin Hébert
  • Michael Woodford

Abstract

We propose a new principle for measuring the cost of information structures in rational inattention problems, based on the cost of generating the information used to make a decision through a dynamic evidence accumulation process. We introduce a continuous-time model of sequential information sampling, and show that, in a broad class of cases, the choice frequencies resulting from optimal information accumulation are the same as those implied by a static rational inattention problem with a particular static information-cost function. Among the static cost functions that can be justified in this way is the mutual information cost function proposed by Sims (2010), but we show that other cost functions can be micro-founded in this way as well. In particular, we introduce a class of “neighborhood-based” cost functions, which make it more costly to undertake experiments that can produce different results in similar states, and show that the predictions of this alternative rational inattention theory better conform with evidence from perceptual discrimination experiments.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Hébert & Michael Woodford, 2017. "Rational Inattention and Sequential Information Sampling," NBER Working Papers 23787, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23787
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    Cited by:

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    3. Frederick Callaway & Antonio Rangel & Thomas L Griffiths, 2021. "Fixation patterns in simple choice reflect optimal information sampling," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(3), pages 1-29, March.
    4. Yeon-Koo Che & Konrad Mierendorff, 2019. "Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(8), pages 2993-3029, August.
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    6. David Walker-Jones, 2019. "Rational Inattention and Perceptual Distance," Papers 1909.00888, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2019.
    7. J. A. Garcia & Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez & J. Fdez-Valdivia, 2020. "Confirmatory bias in peer review," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 123(1), pages 517-533, April.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E70 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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