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Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Thierry Magnac, 2018. "Quels étudiants pour quelles universités ? Analyses empiriques de mécanismes d’allocation centralisée," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 69(5), pages 683-708.
  2. Eduardo M Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2019. "Strategy-proofness in the Large," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 81-116.
  3. Calsamiglia, Caterina & Güell, Maia, 2014. "The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona," IZA Discussion Papers 8202, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  4. Monique De Haan & Pieter A. Gautier & Hessel Oosterbeek & Bas van der Klaauw, 2023. "The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(2), pages 388-455.
  5. YingHua He & Thierry Magnac, 2022. "Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(648), pages 2918-2950.
  6. Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2018. "Cognitive ability and games of school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 156-183.
  7. Carvalho, José-Raimundo & Magnac, Thierry & Xiong, Qizhou, 2016. "College Choice and the Selection of Mechanisms: A Structural Empirical Analysis," IWH Discussion Papers 3/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
  8. Gabrielle Fack & Julien Grenet & Yinghua He, 2019. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1486-1529, April.
  9. Estelle Cantillon, 2017. "Broadening the market design approach to school choice," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 613-634.
  10. Cao, Yuan, 2020. "Centralized assignment mechanisms and assortative matching: Evidence from Chinese universities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 255-276.
  11. Caterina Calsamiglia & Annalisa Loviglio, 2017. "Grading on a Curve: When Having Good Peers is not Good," Working Papers wp2018_1704, CEMFI.
  12. Farré, Lídia & Ortega, Francesc & Tanaka, Ryuichi, 2015. "Immigration and School Choices in the Midst of the Great Recession," IZA Discussion Papers 9234, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  13. Calsamiglia, Caterina & Loviglio, Annalisa, 2019. "Grading on a curve: When having good peers is not good," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  14. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-01215998 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Nikhil Agarwal & Paulo Somaini, 2018. "Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(2), pages 391-444, March.
  16. Caterina Calsamiglia & Annalisa Loviglio, 2020. "Maturity and school outcomes in an inflexible system: evidence from Catalonia," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 1-49, March.
  17. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag A. Pathak, 2017. "Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 1373-1432, September.
  18. Christopher Neilson & Adam Kapor & Mohit Karnani, 2020. "Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms," Working Papers 635a, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  19. Caterina Calsamiglia & Francisco Martínez-Mora & Antonio Miralles, 2021. "School Choice Design, Risk Aversion and Cardinal Segregation," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(635), pages 1081-1104.
  20. Yusuke Narita, 2020. "A Theory of Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of School Quality," Working Papers 2020-085, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
  21. Christopher Neilson & Adam Kapor & Mohit Karnani, 2020. "Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms," Working Papers 635a, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  22. Ian Walker & Matthew Weldon, 2020. "School choice, admission, and equity of access," Working Papers 298202686, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  23. Caterina Calsamiglia & Francisco Martinez-Mora & Antonio Miralles, 2017. "Sorting in public school districts under the Boston Mechanism," Working Papers 949, Barcelona School of Economics.
  24. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Nikhil Agarwal & Parag A. Pathak, 2015. "The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match," NBER Working Papers 21046, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. He, Yinghua & Magnac, Thierry, 2018. "A Pigouvian Approach to Congestion in Matching Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 11967, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  26. Adam Kapor & Mohit Karnani & Christopher Neilson, 2019. "Negative Externalities of Off Platform Options and the Efficiency of Centralized Assignment Mechanisms," Working Papers 635, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  27. Yusuke Narita, 2021. "A Theory of Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of School Quality," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(8), pages 4982-5010, August.
  28. Chen, Li & Sebastián Pereyra, Juan, 2019. "Self-selection in school choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 59-81.
  29. Caterina Calsamiglia & Francisco Martínez-Mora & Antonio Miralles, 2015. "School Choice Mechanisms, Peer Effects and Sorting," Discussion Papers in Economics 15/01, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
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