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Noisy observation in adverse selection models

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2010. "The renegotiation cost of public transport services contracts," Working Papers hal-00622961, HAL.
  2. Miravete, Eugenio, 2001. "Quantity Discounts for Time-Varying Consumers," CEPR Discussion Papers 2699, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2352-2383, October.
  4. Briglauer, Wolfgang & Holzleitner, Christian, 2014. "Efficient contracts for government intervention in promoting next generation communications networks," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-022, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  5. Felipe Balmaceda, 2020. "Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 601-637, June.
  6. Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang, 2013. "Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 377-404.
  7. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Withers, John A., 2019. "Dynamic regulation revisited: Signal dampening, experimentation and the ratchet effect," DICE Discussion Papers 318, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  8. Briglauer, Wolfgang & Holzleitner, Christian & Vogelsang, Ingo, 2016. "The need for more efficient public funding of new communications infrastructure in EU member states," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 26-35.
  9. Peter Eso & Balazs Szentes, 2003. "The One Who Controls the Information Appropriates Its Rents," Discussion Papers 1369, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez & Dylan Possamaï & Chao Zhou, 2020. "Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection," Post-Print hal-01435460, HAL.
  11. Robert J. Gary-Bobo & Alain Trannoy, 2015. "Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 546-576, September.
  12. Felipe Balmaceda, 2012. "On the Optimality of One-size-fits-all Contracts: The Limited Liability Case," Documentos de Trabajo 291, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  13. Christian Espinosa & Juan Gorigoitía & Carlos Maquieira, 2012. "Nonlinear behaviour of EMBI index:the case of eastern European countries," Working Papers 37, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
  14. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Eugenio J. Miravete, "undated". "Quantity Discounts for Taste-Varying Consumers," Penn CARESS Working Papers e8c875d525675df452b9522a2, Penn Economics Department.
  16. David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2020. "Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(1), pages 301-317, March.
  17. Philippe Bontems & Jean-Marc Bourgeon, 1996. "Régulation par la production ou par l'intrant en présence d'incertitude," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 43, pages 181-193.
  18. Hellwig, Martin F., 2009. "A reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling model of outside finance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 495-525, October.
  19. Leon Yang Chu & David E. M. Sappington, 2010. "Contracting with private knowledge of signal quality," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 244-269, June.
  20. Aditya U. Kulkarni & Christian Wernz, 2020. "Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 288(1), pages 307-329, May.
  21. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
  22. Ehsan Bolandifar & Tianjun Feng & Fuqiang Zhang, 2018. "Simple Contracts to Assure Supply Under Noncontractible Capacity and Asymmetric Cost Information," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 20(2), pages 217-231, May.
  23. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2001. "Screening Through Bundling," Penn CARESS Working Papers 3b8e0b3847b08b90e8570987c, Penn Economics Department.
  24. Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez & Dylan Possamaï & Chao Zhou, 2017. "Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection," Working Papers hal-01435460, HAL.
  25. Jaeyoung Sung, 2005. "Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: A Continuous-Time Approach," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(3), pages 1021-1073.
  26. Escobar, Juan F. & Pulgar, Carlos, 2017. "Motivating with simple contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 192-214.
  27. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
  28. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 149-173, November.
  29. Suren Basov & Svetlana Danilkina, 2010. "Multitasking, Multidimensional Screening, and Moral Hazard with Risk Neutral Agents," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 86(s1), pages 80-86, September.
  30. Long Gao, 2023. "Optimal Incentives for Salespeople with Learning Potential," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3285-3296, June.
  31. El Bouhadi, Abdelhamid, 2006. "Contrat de travail et précarisation : une modélisation de l’information asymétrique d’une situation atypique, cas des pays pauvres et en développement [Employment contract and insecurity jobs: asym," MPRA Paper 19859, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  32. Chassagnon, A. & Chiappori, P.A., 1994. "Insurance Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Case of Pure Competition," Papers 28, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
  33. Sandrine Ollier, 2007. "On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(1), pages 1-11, June.
  34. Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, 1991. "Communication in Settings with No. Transfers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 173-198, Summer.
  35. Sandrine Ollier, 2006. "Un effet pervers de la responsabilité limitée," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 265-286.
  36. Leonard J. Mirman & Thomas D. Jeitschko, 2002. "Information and experimentation in short-term contracting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(2), pages 311-331.
  37. repec:hal:psewpa:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS
  38. Nicol'as Hern'andez Santib'a~nez & Dylan Possamai & Chao Zhou, 2017. "Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection," Papers 1701.05864, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2019.
  39. Zhaolin Li & Samuel N. Kirshner, 2021. "Salesforce Compensation and Two‐Sided Ambiguity: Robust Moral Hazard with Moment Information," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(9), pages 2944-2961, September.
  40. Deneckere, Raymond & de Palma, André & Leruth, Luc, 2019. "Risk sharing in procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 173-220.
  41. Sandrine Ollier, 2007. "On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment," Post-Print hal-00447191, HAL.
  42. Miravete, Eugenio J., 2011. "Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 479-490.
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