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Citations for "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring"

by George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris

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  1. Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 10 Feb 2011.
  2. Marco Battaglini & Steve Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001094, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Folk Theorem with Communication," UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 366, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013. "Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1891-1928.
  5. Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 174-192, January.
  6. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
  7. Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid, 2009. "Repeated games with one-memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 312-336, January.
  8. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2012. "Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1998-2027.
  9. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  10. Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Ott, Ursula F., 2013. "International Business Research and Game Theory: Looking beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma," International Business Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 480-491.
  12. Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jul 2005.
  13. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
  14. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)," UCLA Economics Online Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 365, UCLA Department of Economics.