The Corporate Governance of Benedictine Abbeys: What can Stock Corporations Learn from Monasteries?
AbstractThe corporate governance structure of monasteries is analyzed to derive new insights into solving agency problems of modern corporations. In the long history of monasteries, some abbots and monks lined their own pockets and monasteries were undisciplined. Monasteries developed special systems to check these excesses and therefore were able to survive for centuries. These features are studied from an economic perspective. Benedictine monasteries in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and German speaking Switzerland have an average lifetime of almost 500 years and only a quarter of them broke up as a result of agency problems. We argue that this is due to an appropriate governance structure, relying strongly on the intrinsic motivation of the members and on internal control mechanisms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 374.
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Corporate Governance; Principal-Agency-Theory; Psychological Economics; Monasteries; Benedictine Order;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-06-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2008-06-13 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HIS-2008-06-13 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-HPE-2008-06-13 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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