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The Costs of Supervisory Fragmentation in Europe

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  • Schüler, Martin
  • Heinemann, Friedrich

Abstract

Financial markets in Europe become more and more integrated. The persisting fragmentation of financial supervision, however, constitutes a lasting obstacle to integration. The aim of this paper is to assess these costs of supervisory fragmentation. We find clear evidence for the existence of economies of scale in banking supervision. An increase in supervisory output by one percent causes institutional supervisory cost to rise by only some 0.5 percent. Based on these estimation results we predict institutional cost saving of around 15 percent in a plausible simulation scenario representing a cost-efficient European supervisory framework. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 05-01.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:2892

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Keywords: financial supervision; costs; economies of scale;

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References

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  1. Gregory Elliehausen, 1998. "The cost of banking regulation: a review of the evidence," Staff Studies 171, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  2. Gual, Jordi, 2004. "The Integration of EU Banking Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 4212, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Dirk Schoenmaker & Paolo Dasgupta & Charles Goodhart, 2001. "The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Supervisors," FMG Discussion Papers dp377, Financial Markets Group.
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Cited by:
  1. Florian Buck & Eva Schliephake, 2012. "The Regulator's Trade-off: Bank Supervision vs. Minimum Capital," CESifo Working Paper Series 3923, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Buck, Florian & Schliephake, Eva, 2013. "The regulator’s trade-off: Bank supervision vs. minimum capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4584-4598.
  3. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2006. "Home country versus cross-border negative externalities in large banking organization failures and how to avoid them," Working Paper 2006-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.

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