Supervision of financial conglomerates : the case of Chile
AbstractThe author describes the presence of financial conglomerates and assesses the extent to which the risks they introduce to the Chilean financial system are mitigated by existing oversight arrangements (and at what cost). In particular, he questions whether the current silo-based supervisory framework, which has served the system fairly well until now, can continue unchanged given growing inter-linkages in the financial system. The author proposes a high-level short- and medium-term supervisory reform agenda that addresses identified vulnerabilities relating to financial conglomerates and continues the migration from a rules-oriented to a risk-based supervisory approach that has gradually been taking place in Chile in recent years.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3553.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Banks&Banking Reform; Financial Intermediation; Environmental Economics&Policies; Non Bank Financial Institutions; Insurance&Risk Mitigation;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-FIN-2005-12-14 (Finance)
- NEP-FMK-2005-12-14 (Financial Markets)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Risk in Financial Conglomerates: Management and Supervision,"
Research Series Supervision (discontinued)
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