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Ministererlaubnis für Kartellfälle: Kooperation im Sinne des Gemeinwohls?

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  • Budzinski, Oliver
  • Stöhr, Annika

Abstract

Mit der Umsetzung der 7. Novelle des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbe-schränkungen (GWB) wurde im Jahr 2005 die Ausnahmeregelung des sog. Ministerkartells nach § 8 GWB ersatzlos gestrichen. Ähnlich dem noch bestehenden Instrument der Ministererlaubnis für Fusionen nach § 42 GWB konnte bis dahin der amtierende Bundeswirtschaftsminister aus "überwiegenden Gründen der Gesamtwirtschaft und des Gemeinwohls" (§ 8 (1) GWB) sowie bei unmittelbarer "Gefahr für den Bestand des überwiegenden Teils der Unternehmen eines Wirtschaftszweigs" (§ 8 (2) 1 GWB) eine Ausnahme vom Kartellverbot nach § 1 GWB aussprechen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden zunächst die Ausgestaltung und die ökonomische Sinnhaftigkeit des Instrumentes an sich beleuchtet. Dabei wird insbesondere auf potenzielle Gemeinwohlgründe eingegangen, welche in der aktuellen wissenschaftlichen und politischen Diskussion im Vordergrund stehen: Umwelt- und Tierschutz, sowie die Bildung und Unterstützung von sog. National Champion Unternehmen. Abschließend wird ein Vergleich der Instrumente Ministerkartell und Ministererlaubnis für Fusionen vorgenommen, welcher zeigt, dass ein ministererlaubtes Kartell häufig weniger starke negative Wettbewerbswirkungen hätte, als eine irreversible Fusion. Aus ökonomischer Sicht wäre somit ein Ersatz des vieldiskutierten Instrumentes Ministererlaubnis nach § 42 GWB durch eine Regelung zur Ausnahmeerlaubnis von Kartellen zu erwägen. Allerdings würde jedes derartige Instrument erheblicher Absicherungen gegen eine ungeeignete oder missbräuchliche Anwendung bedürfen, ohne welche ein Verzicht die bessere Lösung darstellt.

Suggested Citation

  • Budzinski, Oliver & Stöhr, Annika, 2020. "Ministererlaubnis für Kartellfälle: Kooperation im Sinne des Gemeinwohls?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 143, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:143
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ministererlaubnis; Ministerkartell; Wettbewerbspolitik; Fusionskontrolle; Kartellverbot; Wettbewerbsökonomik; Antitrust; Recht & Ökonomik; Wettbewerbsordnung; Wirtschaftspolitik; competition policy; cartels; merger control; antitrust; law & economics; German competition policy; public interest;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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