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Five years after the Liikanen Report: What have we learned?

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  • Götz, Martin
  • Krahnen, Jan Pieter
  • Tröger, Tobias

Abstract

The publication of the Liikanen Group's final report in October 2012 was surrounded by high expectations regarding the implementation of the reform plans through the proposed measures that reacted to the financial and sovereign debt crises. The recommendations mainly focused on introducing a mild version of banking separation and the creation of the preconditions for bail-in measures. In this article, we present an overview of the regulatory reforms, to which the financial sector has been subject over the past years in accordance with the concepts laid out in the Liikanen Report. It becomes clear from our assessment that more specific steps have yet to be taken before the agenda is accomplished. In particular, bail-in rules must be implemented more consistently. Beyond the question of the required minimum, the authors develop the notion of a maximum amount of liabilities subject to bail-in. The combination of both components leads to a three-layer structure of bank capital: a bail-in tranche, a deposit-insured bailout tranche, and an intermediate run-endangered mezzanine tranche. The size and treatment of the latter must be put to a political debate that weighs the costs and benefits of a further increase in financial stability beyond that achieved through loss-bearing of the bail-in tranche.

Suggested Citation

  • Götz, Martin & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Tröger, Tobias, 2017. "Five years after the Liikanen Report: What have we learned?," SAFE White Paper Series 50, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewh:50
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    Cited by:

    1. Farina, Tatiana & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Pelizzon, Loriana & Wahrenburg, Mark, 2019. "What are the main factors for the subdued profitability of significant banks in the Banking Union, and is the ECB's supervisory response conclusive and exhaustive? A critical assessment of the 2018 SS," SAFE White Paper Series 65, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    2. Götz, Martin & Tröger, Tobias & Wahrenburg, Mark, 2019. "The next SSM term: Supervisory challenges ahead," SAFE White Paper Series 59, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    3. Heider, Florian & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Pelizzon, Loriana & Schlegel, Jonas & Tröger, Tobias, 2023. "European lessons from Silicon Valley Bank resolution: A plea for a comprehensive demand deposit protection scheme (CDDPS)," SAFE Policy Letters 98, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    4. Beck, Thorsten & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Martin, Philippe J. & Mayer, Franz C. & Pisani-Ferry, Jean & Tröger, Tobias & Weder, Beatrice & Véron, Nicolas & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2022. "Completing the banking union: Economic requirements and legal conditions," SAFE White Paper Series 93, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial stability; banking separation; prohibition of proprietary trading; banking and treasury functions; bail-in; MREL; TLAC;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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