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Wenn Banken sich vergessen ...: Risikoregulierung im internationalen Mehr-Ebenen-System

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  • Lütz, Susanne
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    Abstract

    Globalisierungsprozesse erzeugen Problemlagen, die allein durch nationalstaatliche Intervention nicht mehr zu bewältigen sind. Pessimistische Szenarien schließen daraus auf ein generelles „Steuerungsversagen“ des Nationalstaates mit der Folge einer wettbewerblichen Deregulierung von Sicherheitsstandards („race to the bottom“). Eher optimistische Vertreter des politikwissenschaftlichen „Regimeansatzes“ sehen die Aushandlung selbstbindender Lösungen zwischen Vertretern betroffener Territorien als Schlüssel für den Rückgewinn von Problemlösungsfähigkeit an. Der folgende Beitrag zeigt hingegen am Beispiel der Geschichte internationaler Bankenregulierung, daß das internationale Mehr-Ebenen-System vielmehr eine „requisite variety“ an institutionellen Problemlösungen bietet. Je nach Art des Finanzrisikos und damit des Regelungsproblems, das sich mit unterschiedlichen Phasen finanzwirtschaftlicher Globalisierung stellt, kann es sich hierbei um international verhandelte Sicherheitsstandards oder um komplexere Mehr-Ebenen-Arrangements handeln, die internationale Koordination mit nationalen Lernprozessen kombinieren. -- Processes of economic globalization create regulatory problems that can no longer be solved at the nation-state level alone. Pessimistic scenarios forecast that states will lose control of their policy instruments and that deregulatory races to the bottom are likely to follow. More optimistic protagonists of the international regime approach however contend that territorial representatives might engage in intergovernmental negotiations that lead to successful binding commitments. This paper argues that a multi-level-governance system offers a requisite variety of institutional solutions that address the regulatory problems better. A historical analysis of the evolution of regulatory arrangements in international banking shows that different institutional settings are chosen depending on the degree of financial globalization. Some aspects of risk can be dealt with through intergouvernemental negotiations. Others associated with more pronounced globalization demand more complex multi-level governance arrangements which combine international coordination with nation-state specific learning processes.

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    Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in its series MPIfG Discussion Paper with number 98/5.

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    Date of creation: 1998
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:p0048

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    1. M.J.B. Hall, 1996. "The amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risk," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(197), pages 271-277.
    2. Robert Litan & William Isaac & William Taylor, 1994. "Financial Regulation," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: American Economic Policy in the 1980s, pages 519-572 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Kapstein, Ethan Barnaby, 1992. "Between power and purpose: central bankers and the politics of regulatory convergence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(01), pages 265-287, December.
    4. M.J.B. Hall, 1996. "The amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risk," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(197), pages 271-277.
    5. Haas, Peter M., 1992. "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(01), pages 1-35, December.
    6. Thomas M. Hoenig, 1996. "Rethinking financial regulation," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q II, pages 5-13.
    7. Kapstein, Ethan B., 1989. "Resolving the regulator's dilemma: international coordination of banking regulations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(02), pages 323-347, March.
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