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Fiscal disparity, institutions and asymmetric yardstick competition

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  • Farah, Alfa

Abstract

Fiscal disparity leads to a yardstick bias, in that incumbents in fiscally-rich jurisdictions can provide more public goods, extract more rents and yet have a higher probability to be reelected. This study further emphasizes disparity among jurisdictions, not only in terms of fiscal resources but also of costs of rent appropriation. In a setting in which jurisdictions with a higher fiscal capacity have lower costs of rent appropriation whilst those with a lower fiscal capacity have higher costs of rent appropriation, the difference in costs of rent appropriation might moderate the bias caused by the fiscal disparity.

Suggested Citation

  • Farah, Alfa, 2018. "Fiscal disparity, institutions and asymmetric yardstick competition," CIW Discussion Papers 2/2018, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ciwdps:22018
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Caldeira, Emilie, 2012. "Yardstick competition in a federation: Theory and evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 878-897.
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    6. Allers, Maarten A., 2012. "Yardstick competition, fiscal disparities, and equalization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 4-6.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    accountability; rent; fiscal capacity; institutions; yardstick competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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