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Financing practices in the German venture capital industry: An empirical assessment

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  • Bascha, Andreas
  • Walz, Uwe
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    Abstract

    This paper investigates the financial contracting behavior of German venture capitalists against the results of recent theoretical work on the design of venture capital contracts, especially with regard to the use of convertible securities. First, we identify a special feature of the German market, namely that public-private partnership agencies require significantly lower returns than private and young venture capitalists. The latter are most likely to follow their North-American counterpart by refinancing themselves with closed-end funds. Second, with regard to financing practices it is shown that the use of convertibles, relative to other instruments, is influenced by the anticipated severity of agency problems. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Center for Financial Studies (CFS) in its series CFS Working Paper Series with number 2002/08.

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    Date of creation: 2002
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200208

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    Keywords: Venture Capital; Convertible Securities; Agency Theory;

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    References

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1989. "Default And Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model Of Debt," Working papers 520, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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    4. Cornelli, Francesca & Yosha, Oved, 1997. "Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 1735, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Thomas Hellmann, 1998. "The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 57-76, Spring.
    6. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    7. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    8. Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 2004. "Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach," Review of Finance, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 75-108.
    9. Casamatta, Catherine, 2002. "Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists," CEPR Discussion Papers 3475, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    11. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Gordon Murray, 1999. "Early-stage venture capital funds, scale economies and public support," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(4), pages 351-384, October.
    13. Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, 2000. "Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 674-692, Winter.
    14. Trester, Jeffrey J., 1998. "Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 675-699, August.
    15. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Siegel, Daniel R & Thakor, Anjan V, 1990. "Learning, Corporate Control and Performance Requirements in Venture Capital Contracts," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(2), pages 365-81, May.
    16. Cornelli, F. & Yosha, O., 1997. "Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Debt," Papers 23-97, Tel Aviv.
    17. Chan, Yuk-Shee, 1983. " On the Positive Role of Financial Intermediation in Allocation of Venture Capital in a Market with Imperfect Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(5), pages 1543-68, December.
    18. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
    19. Greenwald, Bruce & Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1984. "Informational Imperfections in the Capital Market and Macroeconomic Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 194-99, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Michael Stolpe, 2004. "Europe's Entry into the Venture Capital Business: Efficiency and Policy," Kiel Working Papers 1223, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    2. Fritsch, Michael & Schilder, Dirk, 2006. "Does venture capital investment really require spatial proximity? An empirical investigation," Freiberg Working Papers 2006,07, TU Bergakademie Freiberg, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    3. Schilder, Dirk, 2006. "Public venture capital in Germany: task force or forced task?," Freiberg Working Papers 2006,12, TU Bergakademie Freiberg, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    4. Dorothea Schäfer & Dirk Schilder, 2006. "Informed Capital in a Hostile Environment: The Case of Relational Investors in Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 549, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Schwienbacher, Armin, 2007. "A theoretical analysis of optimal financing strategies for different types of capital-constrained entrepreneurs," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 753-781, November.
    6. Armin Schwienbacher, 2008. "Venture capital investment practices in Europe and the United States," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 195-217, September.
    7. Gil Avnimelech & Alessandro Rosiello & Morris Teubal, 2010. "Evolutionary interpretation of venture capital policy in Israel, Germany, UK and Scotland," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 101-112, March.
    8. Bienz, Carsten & Walz, Uwe, 2007. "Evolution of Decision and Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," Discussion Papers 2007/13, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
    9. Christian Hopp & Finn Rieder, 2005. "Strukturanalyse des deutschen Marktes für Beteiligungskapital: Unterschiede im Investitionsverhalten unabhängiger, bankenassoziierter und öffentlicher Venture-Capital-Investoren und Auswirkungen au," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 74(4), pages 140-152.
    10. David B. Audretsch & Erik E. Lehmann, 2004. "Financing High-Tech Growth: The Role of Debt or Equity," Papers on Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy 2004-19, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy Group.
    11. Tykvová, Tereza, 2003. "Is the Behavior of German Venture Capitalists Different? Evidence from the Neuer Markt," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-44, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    12. Carsten Bienz & Uwe Walz, 2006. "Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24637, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Michael Stolpe, 2003. "Learning and Signalling in the French and German Venture Capital Industries," Kiel Working Papers 1156, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    14. Hirsch, Julia & Walz, Uwe, 2006. "Why do contracts differ between VC types? Market segmentation versus corporate governance varieties," CFS Working Paper Series 2006/12, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    15. Dorothea Schaefer & Dirk Schilder, 2007. "Smart capital in German start-ups - an empirical analysis," Jena Economic Research Papers 2007-015, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
    16. Valérie Revest & Sandro Sapio, 2008. "Financing Technology-Based Small Firms in Europe: a review of the empirical evidence," LEM Papers Series 2008/23, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    17. John Armour & Douglas Cumming, 2006. "The legislative road to Silicon Valley," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(4), pages 596-635, October.

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