Persuasion by stress testing: Optimal disclosure of supervisory information in the banking sector
AbstractThe game-theoretical analysis of this paper shows that stress tests that cover the entire banking sector (macro stress tests) can be performed by institutional supervisors to improve welfare. In a multi-receiver framework of Bayesian persuasion we show that a banking authority can create value when committing to disclose the stress-testing methodology (signal-generating process) together with the stress test result (signal). Disclosing two pieces of information is a typical procedure used in stress tests. By optimally choosing these two signals, supervisors can deliver superior information to prudent investors and enhance welfare. The paper offers a new theory to explain why stress tests are generally welfare enhancing. We also offer a treatment of the borderline case where the banking sector is hit by a crisis, in which case the supervisor will optimally disclose an uninformative signal. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre in its series Discussion Papers with number 32/2012.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Stress Tests; Supervisory Information; Bayesian Persuasion; Multiple Receivers; Disclosure;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2012-12-22 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2012-12-22 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2012-12-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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