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The Chinese government's new approach to ownership and financial control of strategic state-owned enterprises

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  • Mattlin, Mikael

Abstract

This paper reviews recent regulatory and policy changes that affect the Chinese central government's ownership and authority over the capital allocations of strategic state-owned enterprises (SOE).The paper examines the reform of the central government's relationship with key SOEs as a consequence of the establishment of the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003, the coming introduction of a centralised operating and budgeting system for SOEs, and the government's ongoing re-evaluation of its ownership policy.SASAC appears to have the potential to develop into a major actor in China's domestic capital allocation, with an active role in strategic financing and restructuring of key sectors of the Chinese economy. The data reviewed for this paper strongly suggests that the Chinese central government aims to retain significant ownership control over key SOEs and, by extension, over a major part of the domestic economy.The new operating and budgeting system is set to significantly enhance central government control over SOEs' capital allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Mattlin, Mikael, 2007. "The Chinese government's new approach to ownership and financial control of strategic state-owned enterprises," BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2007, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bofitp:bdp2007_010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tang, Le, 2023. "SOEs reform and capital efficiency in China: A structural analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-20.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    State-owned enterprises; privatisation; corporate governance; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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