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On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming

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Author Info
Thomas Quint () (University of Nevada, Reno)
Jun Wako () (Gakushuin University)
Abstract

We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974), with indfferences in preferences allowed. It is well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multi-valued. We define a condition on such games called "segmentability", which means that the set of players can be partitioned into a "top trading segmentation". It generalizes Gale's well-known idea of the partition of players into "top trading cycles" (which is used to find the unique strict core allocation in the model with no indifference). We prove that a game has a nonempty strict core if and only if it is segmentable. We then use this result to devise and O(n^3) algorithm which takes as input any houseswapping game, and returns either a strict core allocation or a report that the strict core is empty. Finally, we are also able to construct a linear inequality system whose feasible region's extreme points precisely correspond to the allocations of the strict core. This last result parallels the results of Vande Vate (1989) and Rothbum (1991) for the marriage game of Gale and Shapley (1962).

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Paper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number ysm373.

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Date of creation: 28 Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm373

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Related research
Keywords: Shapley-Scarf Economy; Strict Core; Linear Inequality System; Extreme Points;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - General
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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  1. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2005. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market," NBER Working Papers 11402, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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