Hammond (J Econ Theory 11, 465–467, 1975), Meyer (J Econ Theory 11, 119–132, 1975), and Lambert (The distribution and redistribution of income, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2001) provide the formal result connecting leximin and the idea of extreme inequality aversion for social preferences of the expected utility type. Using an analogous approach, we show that for social preferences not necessarily satisfying the separability axiom that underlies expected utility theory, the case of extreme inequality aversion is covered by the class of weakly maximin social preferences——i.e., the class of social preferences that give priority to the worst off in all cases in which the worst off is not indifferent.
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Paper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Working Group Public Economics in its series Public Economics Working Paper Series with number
extrin.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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