Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

What Does the UN Convention on Corruption Teach Us About International Regulatory Harmonisation?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bryane Michael

    (Oxford University)

Abstract

Should international institutions promote international regulatory harmonisation? This paper will present arguments, looking at the UN Convention Against Corruption, noting that international institution regulation may play less of a harmonising role that it ostensibly appears to. Section I discusses the underlying motivations for harmonisation, presenting three views of regulation based on the likely effects of 'globalisation' and noting most views support global harmonisation. Section II will discuss specifically the UN Corruption Convention and compare the Convention (which aims at global harmonising of certain practices against corruption) against its ideals and an optimal regulation. Section III will discuss the influence of regulatory 'clubs' (such as the OECD or OAS Corruption Conventions) and show how regional harmonisation may be superior to global harmonisation in terms of reaching an ideal and optimum. Section III will address how global harmonisation may be deleterious to national interests and will discuss how such global harmonisation may be 'domesticated' in the nations' laws and moeurs. Because business practices depend on a wide range of influences in the national business system, attempts at harmonisation are at best 'ambivalent'.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/mac/papers/0406/0406004.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Macroeconomics with number 0406004.

as in new window
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 05 Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0406004

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kalypso Nicolaodis, 1997. "Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Regimes: Some Lessons and Prospects," Jean Monnet Working Papers 7, Jean Monnet Chair.
  2. Hall, Peter A. & Soskice, David (ed.), 2001. "Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247752.
  3. Tharp, Paul A., 1976. "Transnational enterprises and international regulation: A survey of various approaches in international organizations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(01), pages 47-73, December.
  4. Richard R. Nelson, 1995. "Recent Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 48-90, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Argandoña, Antonio, 2006. "The United Nations convention against corruption and its impact on international companies," IESE Research Papers D/656, IESE Business School, revised 12 Oct 2006.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0406004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.