Anti-corruption programmes in post-communist transition countries and changes in the business environment, 1999-2002
AbstractThis paper analyses the anti-corruption activities of 24 transition countries in the period 1999-2002. These activities are divided into omnibus anti-corruption programmes, legislative reform aimed at tackling corruption, and adherence to international anti-corruption conventions. The paper presents a new measure for determining the extent of anti- corruption activity undertaken in these three categories during 1999- 2002. Using the results of a large survey of firms across the region, the paper shows that countries with low levels of administrative corruption were more likely to adopt intensive anti-corruption programmes than countries with high levels of administrative corruption, independent of the level of state capture Across the transition countries, omnibus anti-corruption programmes and membership in international anti-corruption conventions have not led to reductions in the level of either administrative corruption or state capture – at least in this relatively short time period – while new or amended laws aimed at tackling corruption have led to reductions in administrative corruption, but not in levels of state capture. Finally, the paper finds that perceptions of corruption – measured in terms of the degree to which firms consider corruption to be an obstacle to the operation and growth of their business – are positively correlated with the intensity of anti-corruption programmes. This finding suggests that by launching high-profile anti-corruption initiatives, governments may be more likely to heighten managers’ perceptions of the problem rather than to reduce the impact of corruption on firms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 0401004.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 21 Jan 2004
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on Win2000; pages: 41; figures: 7
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business environment; law; state capture; governance; corruption; anti-corruption; legislative reform;
Other versions of this item:
- Franklin Steves & Alan Rousso, 2003. "Anti-corruption programmes in post-communist transition countries and changes in the business environment, 1999-2002," Working Papers 85, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chief Economist.
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- P30 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
- P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
- P33 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - International Trade, Finance, Investment, Business, and Aid
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-01-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2004-01-25 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2004-01-25 (Public Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2004-01-25 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Islam, Roumeen, 2003. "do more transparent government govern better?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3077, The World Bank.
- Huther, Jeff & Shah, Anwar, 2000. "Anti-corruption policies and programs : a framework for evaluation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2501, The World Bank.
- Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005.
"Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation,"
0506, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation," Post-Print halshs-00180044, HAL.
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