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Shedding light on El Farol

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Author Info
Damien Challet (Nomura Centre for Quantative Finance, Mathematical Institute, Oxford University, UK)
Matteo Marsili (Internation Center for Theoretical Physics, Trieste, Italy)
Gabriele Ottino (Département de Physique, Université de Fribourg, Switzerland)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We mathematize El Farol bar problem and transform it into a workable model. We find general conditions under which the convergence of the average attendance to the resource level is trivial and does not even require any intelligence on the side of agents. Secondly, specializing to a particular ensemble of continuous strategies leads this problem to a model similar to the Minority Game. Statistical physics of disordered systems allows us to derive a complete understanding of the complex behavior of this model, on the basis of its phase diagram.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0406/0406002.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0406002.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 10 Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0406002

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 8
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: El Farol; Minority Game; resource level; biased strategies;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Cited by:
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  1. Duncan Whitehead, 2008. "The El Farol Bar Problem Revisited: Reinforcement Learning in a Potential Game," ESE Discussion Papers 186, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  2. Christina Matzke & Damien Challet, 2008. "Taking a shower in Youth Hostels: risks and delights of heterogeneity," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse1_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

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