Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On the Notion of Social Institutions


Author Info

  • Guilherme Carmona


We argue that it is natural to study social institutions within the framework of standard game theory (i.e., only by resorting to concepts like players, actions, strategies, information sets, payoff functions, and stochastic processes describing the moves of nature, which constitute a stochastic game when combined) --- concepts like ``social norms,'' and ``mechanisms'' can be easily accommodated, as well as philosophical/sociological definitions of social institutions Focusing on strategies rather than on mechanisms have two advantages: First, focusing on strategies allows us to distinguish between those aspects that are behavioral in nature and are subject to alternative design, and those that are part of the environment. Second, considering strategies allows for a more detailed look into the way an outcome function is ``genuinely implemented'' (see Hurwicz (1996)).

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0402005.

as in new window
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 27 Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0402005

Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on winxp; to print on general; pages: 15; figures: 0. none
Contact details of provider:
Web page:

Related research

Keywords: Social institutions; mechanism design;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "A Re-Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0311005, EconWPA.
  2. Carmona, Guilherme, 2003. "A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp425, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  3. Guilherme Carmona, 2006. "A Strong Anti-Folk Theorem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 131-151, April.


This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


Access and download statistics


When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0402005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.