Moral Hazard, Agency Costs, and Asset Prices in a Competitive Equilibrium
AbstractThe behavior of economic agents in the presence of uncertainty about exogenous events and imperfect information about the endogenously influenced actions of other agents with whom they contract has been receiving growing attention. In particular, the economic theory of agency explicitly recognizes that when agents enter into synergistic relationships, each agent will act in a manner consistent with the maximization of its personal welfare, thus giving rise to a phenomenon called moral hazard.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Finance with number 0411033.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 11 Nov 2004
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Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31
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Other versions of this item:
- Ramakrishnan, Ram T. S. & Thakor, Anjan V., 1982. "Moral Hazard, Agency Costs, and Asset Prices in a Competitive Equilibrium," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(04), pages 503-532, November.
- G - Financial Economics
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- Ramakrishnan, Ram T S & Thakor, Anjan V, 1984.
" The Valuation of Assets under Moral Hazard,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 39(1), pages 229-38, March.
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