Broadband Internet: Open Access and Content Competition
AbstractBroadband “open access” regulation mandates openness of conduits (e.g. upgraded cable television) to service providers (e.g. America Online), but policy discussion often suggests that the ultimate goal is openness to advanced content (streaming video, interactive e-commerce, etc.). We define two forms of regulation, open access and common carriage, and discuss when they are equivalent. We argue that they are quite different in local access broadband. We develop a systems model with free entry and competition in all three industry segments (conduits, service providers, and content) and examine how open access regulation affects the number of firms in each. We confirm the view that an open access requirement can reduce entry of physical conduits, and more surprising we also describe conditions under which it can reduce the amount of content available to consumers.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Wesleyan University, Department of Economics in its series Wesleyan Economics Working Papers with number 2004-002.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
open access; broadband;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
- Gehrig, Thomas, 1998. "Competing markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 277-310, February.
- Church, J. & Gandal, N., 1996.
"Systems Competition, Vertical Merger and Foreclosure,"
6-96, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Jeffrey Church & Neil Gandal, 2000. "Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 25-51, 03.
- Faulhaber, Gerald R & Hogendorn, Christiaan, 2000. "The Market Structure of Broadband Telecommunications," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 305-29, September.
- Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1996.
"Horizontal and vertical differentiation: The Launhardt model,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 485-506, June.
- Dos Santos Ferreira, R. & Thisse, J.-F., . "Horizontal and vertical differentiation: The Launhardt model," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1216, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Byong-Duk Rhee, 1996. "Consumer Heterogeneity and Strategic Quality Decisions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 157-172, February.
- Church, Jeffrey & Gandal, Neil, 1992. "Network Effects, Software Provision, and Standardization," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 85-103, March.
- Rubinfeld, Daniel L & Singer, Hal J, 2001. "Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 299-318, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Manolis Kaparakis).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.