IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/9225.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How Does the World Bank Influence the Development Policy Priorities of Low-Income and Lower-Middle Income Countries ?

Author

Listed:
  • Knack,Stephen
  • Parks,Bradley Christopher
  • Harutyunyan,Ani
  • DiLorenzo,Matthew

Abstract

This study investigates the World Bank's use of lending and non-lending instruments to affect the policy priorities of developing countries. In a typical year, the World Bank lends more than $30 billion to its client countries. It also spends approximately $200 million on the provision of analytical and advisory products each year. However, insufficiently granular data on the nature, timing, and distribution of these analytical and advisory products and the policy priorities of client countries has made it difficult for policymakers and scholars to understand which World Bank instruments are most useful for effectuating change in the direction of government policy. With new data on the delivery of analytical and advisory products and micro-level survey data from 1,244 public sector officials in 121 developing countries, this study demonstrates that the organization’s non-lending instruments are more effective than its lending instruments at influencing the policy priorities of client countries. The World Bank's analytical and advisory products not only affect the direction of government policy, but also its design and implementation.

Suggested Citation

  • Knack,Stephen & Parks,Bradley Christopher & Harutyunyan,Ani & DiLorenzo,Matthew, 2020. "How Does the World Bank Influence the Development Policy Priorities of Low-Income and Lower-Middle Income Countries ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9225, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9225
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/852751588260919707/pdf/How-Does-the-World-Bank-Influence-the-Development-Policy-Priorities-of-Low-Income-and-Lower-Middle-Income-Countries.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lodewijk Smets & Stephen Knack, 2018. "World Bank Policy Lending and the Quality of Public-Sector Governance," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(1), pages 29-54.
    2. Dollar, David & Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 894-917, October.
    3. Michael Clemens and Michael Kremer, 2016. "The New Role of the World Bank - Working Paper 421," Working Papers 421, Center for Global Development.
    4. Andrews,Matt, 2013. "The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107016330.
    5. Kogut, Bruce & Macpherson, J. Muir, 2011. "The mobility of economists and the diffusion of policy ideas: The influence of economics on national policies," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 1307-1320.
    6. Handa, Sudhanshu & Davis, Benjamin, 2006. "The experience of conditional cash transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean," ESA Working Papers 289060, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Agricultural Development Economics Division (ESA).
    7. Edwards, Sebastian, 1997. "Trade Liberalization Reforms and the World Bank," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 43-48, May.
    8. Loayza, Norman & Rigolini, Jamele & Llorente, Gonzalo, 2012. "Do Middle Classes Bring Institutional Reforms?," IZA Discussion Papers 6430, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Gavin, Michael & Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "The World Bank in Historical Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 329-334, May.
    10. Abdul Abiad & Ashoka Mody, 2005. "Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 66-88, March.
    11. Stephen Weymouth & J. Muir Macpherson, 2012. "The Social Construction of Policy Reform: Economists and Trade Liberalization Around the World," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(5), pages 670-702, November.
    12. Easterly, William, 2005. "What did structural adjustment adjust?: The association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-22, February.
    13. Sartori, Anne E., 2003. "An Estimator for Some Binary-Outcome Selection Models Without Exclusion Restrictions," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 111-138, April.
    14. Chwieroth, Jeffrey, 2012. ""The silent revolution": how the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 46623, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    15. Lodewijk Smets & Stephen Knack, 2016. "World Bank Lending and the Quality of Economic Policy," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(1), pages 72-91, January.
    16. Mr. Rabah Arezki & Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Mr. Frederik G Toscani, 2012. "Structural Reforms, IMF Programs and Capacity Building: An Empirical Investigation," IMF Working Papers 2012/232, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Stefan Koeberle & Zoran Stavreski & Jan Walliser, 2006. "Budget Support as More Effective Aid? Recent Experiences and Emerging Lessons," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6958, December.
    18. James A. Robinson & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 126-130, May.
    19. Takaaki Masaki & Bradley C. Parks, 2020. "When do performance assessments influence policy behavior? Micro-evidence from the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 371-408, April.
    20. Carnegie, Allison & Samii, Cyrus, 2019. "International Institutions and Political Liberalization: Evidence from the World Bank Loans Program," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 1357-1379, October.
    21. Peter Moll & Lodewijk Smets, 2020. "Is It the Journey That Matters? A Fresh Look at the Impact of World Bank Policy Lending," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(7), pages 1194-1228, October.
    22. Kapstein,Ethan B. & Converse,Nathan, 2008. "The Fate of Young Democracies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521732628.
    23. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    24. Timothy Besley, 2015. "Law, Regulation, and the Business Climate: The Nature and Influence of the World Bank Doing Business Project," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 29(3), pages 99-120, Summer.
    25. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    26. Abdul Abiad & Ashoka Mody, 2005. "Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 66-88, March.
    27. Adrian Robert Bazbauers, 2019. "World Bank technical assistance: Locating and cultivating sympathetic interlocutors," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 37(5), pages 638-656, September.
    28. Loayza, Norman & Rigolini, Jamele & Llorente, Gonzalo, 2012. "Do middle classes bring about institutional reforms?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 440-444.
    29. Michael A. Clemens & Michael Kremer, 2016. "The New Role for the World Bank," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(1), pages 53-76, Winter.
    30. Lodewijk Smets & Stephen Knack & Nadia Molenaers, 2013. "Political ideology, quality at entry and the success of economic reform programs," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 447-476, December.
    31. Nelson, Stephen C., 2014. "Playing Favorites: How Shared Beliefs Shape the IMF's Lending Decisions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 297-328, April.
    32. Sudhanshu Handa & Benjamin Davis, 2006. "The Experience of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 24(5), pages 513-536, September.
    33. Gilbert, Christopher & Powell, Andrew & Vines, David, 1999. "Positioning the World Bank," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(459), pages 598-633, November.
    34. Doshi, Rush & Kelley, Judith G. & Simmons, Beth A., 2019. "The Power of Ranking: The Ease of Doing Business Indicator and Global Regulatory Behavior," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(3), pages 611-643, July.
    35. Independent Evaluation Group, 2007. "Development Results in Middle-Income Countries : An Evaluation of the World Bank's Support," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6841, December.
    36. Girod, Desha M. & Tobin, Jennifer L., 2016. "Take the Money and Run: The Determinants of Compliance with Aid Agreements," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 209-239, January.
    37. Wane, Waly, 2004. "The quality of foreign aid : country selectivity or donors incentives?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3325, The World Bank.
    38. Deininger, Klaus & Squire, Lyn & Basu, Swati, 1998. "Does Economic Analysis Improve the Quality of Foreign Assistance?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 12(3), pages 385-418, September.
    39. Meseguer, Covadonga, 2006. "Learning and economic policy choices," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 156-178, March.
    40. Kilby, Christopher, 2009. "The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 51-61, May.
    41. Kapstein,Ethan B. & Converse,Nathan, 2008. "The Fate of Young Democracies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521494236.
    42. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    43. Chwieroth, Jeffrey, 2007. "Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 443-463, April.
    44. Kelley, Judith G. & Simmons, Beth A., 2019. "Introduction: The Power of Global Performance Indicators," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(3), pages 491-510, July.
    45. Giordano,Raffaela & Pagano,Patrizio, 2017. "Does the World Bank foster business ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8047, The World Bank.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Katarzyna Bilicka & Daniela Scur, 2021. "Organizational capacity and profit shifting," CEP Discussion Papers dp1795, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. Syeda Tayyaba Ijaz & Sumayya Chughtai, 2022. "The Impact of Financial, Economic and Environmental Factors on Energy Efficiency, Intensity, and Dependence: The Moderating Role of Governance and Institutional Quality," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 12(4), pages 15-31, July.
    3. Ileana Daniela Serban & Ani Harutyunyan, 2021. "The European Union as an International Donor: Perceptions from Latin America and the Caribbean," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 33(6), pages 1820-1839, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Takaaki Masaki & Bradley C. Parks, 2020. "When do performance assessments influence policy behavior? Micro-evidence from the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 371-408, April.
    2. Peter Moll & Lodewijk Smets, 2020. "Is It the Journey That Matters? A Fresh Look at the Impact of World Bank Policy Lending," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(7), pages 1194-1228, October.
    3. Agnello, Luca & Castro, Vitor & Jalles, João Tovar & Sousa, Ricardo M., 2015. "What determines the likelihood of structural reforms?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 129-145.
    4. M. Rodwan Abouharb & Erick Duchesne, 2019. "Economic Development and the World Bank," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 8(5), pages 1-30, May.
    5. Romain Duval & Davide Furceri & Jakob Miethe, 2021. "Robust political economy correlates of major product and labor market reforms in advanced economies: Evidence from BAMLE for logit models," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(1), pages 98-124, January.
    6. Mirko Heinzel & Andrea Liese, 2021. "Managing performance and winning trust: how World Bank staff shape recipient performance," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 625-653, July.
    7. Luca Papi & Andrea F Presbitero & Alberto Zazzaro, 2015. "IMF Lending and Banking Crises," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 63(3), pages 644-691, November.
    8. Lodewijk Smets & Stephen Knack & Nadia Molenaers, 2013. "Political ideology, quality at entry and the success of economic reform programs," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 447-476, December.
    9. Thomas Stubbs & Bernhard Reinsberg & Alexander Kentikelenis & Lawrence King, 2020. "How to evaluate the effects of IMF conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 29-73, January.
    10. Tolga Aksoy, 2016. "The Political Economy Of Structural Reforms," Ekonomi-tek - International Economics Journal, Turkish Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 25-69, January.
    11. Alessandra Bonfiglioli and Gino Gancia, 2010. "The Political Cost of Reforms," Working Papers 507, Barcelona School of Economics.
    12. Vincenzo Galasso, 2014. "The role of political partisanship during economic crises," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 143-165, January.
    13. Lodewijk Smets & Stephen Knack, 2016. "World Bank Lending and the Quality of Economic Policy," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(1), pages 72-91, January.
    14. Davide Romelli, 2022. "The political economy of reforms in Central Bank design: evidence from a new dataset," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 37(112), pages 641-688.
    15. Mitchell Watkins, 2022. "Undermining conditionality? The effect of Chinese development assistance on compliance with World Bank project agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 667-690, October.
    16. Campos, Nauro F. & Horváth, Roman, 2012. "Reform redux: Measurement, determinants and growth implications," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 227-237.
    17. Ferreira, Francisco H. G., 2022. "The analysis of inequality in the Bretton Woods institutions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 116018, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. Djankov, Simeon & Georgieva, Dorina & Ramalho, Rita, 2017. "Determinants of regulatory reform," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118969, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    19. Kilby, Christopher, 2013. "The political economy of project preparation: An empirical analysis of World Bank projects," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 211-225.
    20. Alessandra Bonfiglioli & Rosario Crinò & Gino Gancia, 2022. "Economic uncertainty and structural reforms: Evidence from stock market volatility," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), pages 467-504, May.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9225. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Roula I. Yazigi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dvewbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.