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Light and lightning at the end of the public tunnel : reform of the electricity sector in the Southern Cone

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Author Info
Estache, Antonio
Rodriguez-Pardina, Martin

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Abstract

The authors provide an overview of recent privatization experiences in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. They focus on both achievements and outstanding problems in the electricity sector. They pay special attention to the issue of whether regulators can enforce compliance and sustain the spirit of reform - bringing the forces of competition to the sector - despite the unavoidable adjustments and fine-tuning that effective regulation requires. Among the lessons: Competition, rather than privatization, is the key to transforming the sector. For competition to work, several conditions must be met: 1) The primary energy source must be competitive for competition in the wholesale market to work. (In Chile, the fact that most of the water rights have been allocated to the major generator company seriously limits efficiency in the sector.) 2) Monopolistic stages must be formally separate from other stages, with clear rules for third-party access. (Here, the structure adopted by Argentina seems superior to that adopted by Chile.) 3) New entry into the system is the ultimate test of competition. The main gain from competition in electricity generation comes from the decentralization of decisions about when, how much, and what type of generation has to be brought to the market, rather than from short-term gains from minimizing costs. Overall, vertical and horizontal separation in the sector increases rather than reduces the burden and complexity of regulation. In a disintegrated system, the issues that arose in a traditional monopoly situation (fair rate of return, asset base, tariff to final consumers, and so on) are significantly increased. New issues include third-party access, the promotion of competition, interconnection pricing, and consistency of regulations across stages of competitive development. Restructuring and privatization are still in their early stages so lessons drawn from experience must be considered tentative.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2074.

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Date of creation: 31 Mar 1999
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2074

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Related research
Keywords: Decentralization; Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies; Markets and Market Access; Labor Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Markets and Market Access; Access to Markets; Environmental Economics&Policies; Banks&Banking Reform;

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  1. Carlos Pombo & Manuel Ramírez, 2003. "Privatization in Colombia: A Plant Performance Analysis," RES Working Papers 3151, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Paul L Joskow, 2005. "Incentive Regulation In Theory And Practice - Electricity Distribution And Transmission Networks," Working Papers 0514, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Paul Joskow, 2003. "Electricity Sector Restructuring and Competition: Lessons Learned," Cuadernos de Economía (Latin American Journal of Economics), Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(121), pages 548-558. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Preetum Domah & Pollitt, M.G. & Jon Stern, 2002. "Modelling the Costs of Electricity Regulation: Evidence of Human Resource Constraints in Developing Countries," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0229, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  5. Andres, Luis & Foster, Vivien & Guasch, Jose Luis, 2006. "The impact of privatization on the performance of the infrastructure sector : the case of electricity distribution in Latin American countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3936, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Andres, Luis & Guasch, Jose Luis & Azumendi, Sebastian Lopez, 2008. "Regulatory governance and sector performance : methodology and evaluation for Electricity distribution in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4494, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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