Modelling the Costs of Electricity Regulation: Evidence of Human Resource Constraints in Developing Countries
AbstractSuccessful electricity industry reform depends on the presence of an appropriately staffed regulatory agency for the liberalised sector. However developing countries can have resource constraints that make the establishment of an effective regulatory agency difficult. This paper attempts an econometric modelling of staff numbers in electricity regulatory institutions. We specify a model of the determinants of staff numbers that reflects electricity system complexity as well as national economic and regulatory environments. We empirically estimate a translog cost function specification of the model using data on 60 electricity regulators collected from an international questionnaire survey in 2000-01. We conclude that there are significant differences between the regulatory cost functions of developed and developing countries and that, in establishing independent regulatory agencies, developing countries face high fixed costs relative to market size.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0229.
Date of creation: Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Note: CMI IO
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
Electricity Regulation; International Comparisons; Human Resources;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
- O15 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-11-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2002-11-18 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2002-11-04 (Energy Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Estache, Antonio & Martimort, David, 1999. "Politics, transaction costs, and the design of regulatory institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2073, The World Bank.
- Guasch, J. Luis & Hahn, Robert W., 1997.
"The costs and benefits of regulation : implications for developing countries,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1773, The World Bank.
- Guasch, J Luis & Hahn, Robert W, 1999. "The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Implications for Developing Countries," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 14(1), pages 137-58, February.
- Guasch, J. Luis & Hahn, Robert W., 1999. "The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Implications for Developing Countries," Working paper 120, Regulation2point0.
- Roger G. Noll, .
"The Economics and Politics of the Slowdown in Regulatory Reform,"
1, Brookings Institution Domestic Economics.
- Roger Noll, 2009. "The Economics and Politics of the Slowdown in Regulatory Reform," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 24102, Spring.
- Estache, Antonio & Rodriguez-Pardina, Martin, 1999. "Light and lightning at the end of the public tunnel : reform of the electricity sector in the Southern Cone," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2074, The World Bank.
- Spiller, Pablo T, 1996. "Institutions and Commitment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 421-52.
- Shang-Jin Wei, 2000.
"Natural openness and good government,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
2411, The World Bank.
- Witold Jerzy Henisz, 2004. "Political Institutions and Policy Volatility," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 1-27, 03.
- Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1999. "Governance matters," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2196, The World Bank.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Howard Cobb).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.