A Multi-Agent Model of Tax Evasion with Public Expenditure
AbstractWe develop a model where heterogeneous agents maximize their individual utility based on (after tax) income and on the level of public expenditure (as in Cowell, Gordon, 1988). Agents are different in risk aversion and in the relative preference for public expenditure with respect to personal income. In each period, an agent can optimally conceal some income based on conjectures on the perceived probability of being subject to audits, the perceived level of public expenditure and the perceived amount of tax paid by other individuals. As far as the agent-based model is concerned, we assume that the Government sets the tax rate and the penalties, uses all the revenue to finance public expenditure (with no inefficiency) and fights evasion by controlling a (random) fraction of agents. We show that, through computational experiments based on micro-simulations, stable configurations of tax rates and public expenditure endogenously form in this case as well. In such equilibrium-like situations we find: • a positive relationship between the tax rate and evasion still arises. • tax compliance mainly depends on the distribution of personal features like risk-aversion and the degree of preference for public expenditure. • an endogenous level of tax evasion that is almost not affected by reasonable rates of control. A proper choice of the tax rate results instead in voluntary partial compliance. • the enforcement of higher compliance rates requires unrealistic and costly large-scale audits.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" in its series Working Papers with number 2011_15.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Tax evasion; public expenditure; agent-based models;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2011-11-01 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2011-11-01 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-IUE-2011-11-01 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2011-11-01 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2011-11-01 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sascha Hokamp & Michael Pickhardt, .
"Income Tax Evasion in a Society of Heterogeneous Agents – Evidence from an Agent-based Model,"
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- Michael Pickhardt & Goetz Seibold, . "Income Tax Evasion Dynamics: Evidence from an Agent-based Econophysics Model," Working Papers 201179, Institute of Spatial and Housing Economics, Munster Universitary.
- Pickhardt, Michael & Seibold, Goetz, 2011. "Income tax evasion dynamics: Evidence from an agent-based econophysics model," CAWM Discussion Papers 53, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM), University of Münster.
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