Voting by Ballots and Feet in the Laboratory
AbstractThis paper provides laboratory evidence on the efficiency-enhancing properties of the Tiebout model as a decentralized system of public goods provision. Tiebout (1956) shows that if a sufficient number of local communities exist to accommodate different types of preferences, individuals sort themselves in a way that provides an efficient allocation of public goods and taxes. Our experiment aims to disentangle the effect of voting participation and is composed of two treatments. In the non-participation treatment, local public good provision is chosen by only one subject, while the other members of the community can only stay in or move to another community. In the participation treatment, all the community members have the right to vote as well as to move to another community and collective decisions are taken by majority rule. Our findings show that social welfare is greater in the participation than in the non-participation treatment. We conclude that voting with one’s feet increases efficiency if all the community members vote and that the influence of voting participation on the allocation of local public goods should be taken into account to assess the viability of the Tiebout model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Siena in its series Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena with number 036.
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Tiebout model; local public goods; voting participation; federalism; experiment.;
Other versions of this item:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-01-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2011-01-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2011-01-23 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2011-01-23 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-01-23 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2011-01-23 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Feet vs. ballots in local policy choices
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-02-28 15:54:00
- Butler, Jeffrey & Carbone, Enrica & Conzo, Pierluigi & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2012.
"Reputation and Entry,"
SITE Working Paper Series
21, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Butler, Jeffrey V. & Carbone, Enrica & Conzo, Pierluigi & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2013. "Reputation and Entry," Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2013:3, Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority).
- Jeffrey V. Butler & Enrica Carbone & Pierluigi Conzo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2012. "Reputation and Entry," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 045, University of Siena.
- Jeffrey V. Butler & Enrica Carbone & Pierluigi Conzo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2012. "Reputation and Entry," EIEF Working Papers Series 1215, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Nov 2012.
- Valeria Faralla & Alessandro Innocenti & Eva Venturini, 2013. "Risk Taking and Social Exposure," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 046, University of Siena.
- Valeria Faralla & Alessandro Innocenti & Stefano Taddei & Eva Venturini, 2013. "Physiological Responses to Stressful Work Situations in Low-Immersive Virtual Environments," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 047, University of Siena.
- Enrica Carbone & Gerardo Infante, 2012. "Are Groups Better Planners Than Individuals? An Experimental Analysis," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 042, University of Siena.
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