Revealed preference and indifferent selection
AbstractIt is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior in a way that is robust to indifferent selection (i.e., the agent is indifferent between two alternatives but, nevertheless, is only observed selecting one of them). More precisely, a suggestion by Savage (1954) to reveal indifferent selection by considering small monetary perturbations of alternatives is formalized and generalized to a purely topological framework: references over an arbitrary topological space can be uniquely derived from observed behavior under the assumptions that they are continuous and nonsatiated and that a strictly preferred alternative is always chosen, and indifferent selection is then characterized by discontinuity in choice behavior. Two particular cases are then analyzed: monotonic preferences over a partially ordered set, and preferences representable by a continuous pseudo-utility function.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 952.
Date of creation: Apr 2006
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Revealed preference; indifference; choice behavior; continuity; nonsatiation; monotonicity; pseudo-utility;
Other versions of this item:
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-DCM-2006-04-22 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-UPT-2006-04-22 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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