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Institutions and credit

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  • Farla, Kristine

    ()
    (UNU-MERIT / MGSOG, Maastricht University)

Abstract

It is well-known that the extent of credit lent to private agents differs widely between countries. The `financial deepening' of the economy offers opportunities as well as financial risks. This study investigates the extent to which institutional characteristics are re- lated to countries' level of credit depth. The findings suggest that the formalization of property rights, contracting, and competition institutions is positively related to an increase in the level of credit to the private sector. This result remains robust when controlling for the effect of financial policy. The effect of institutional characteristics on banks' lending capacity and investment is mixed. However, overall, institutional formalization has a positive impact on credit deepening and investment.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT) in its series MERIT Working Papers with number 038.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:unm:unumer:2012038

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Keywords: Institutions; Financial Development; Property Rights; Contract; Competition;

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References

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