Distance rationalizability of scoring rules
AbstractCollective decision making problems can be seen as finding an outcome that is closest to a concept of consensus. 1 introduced Closeness to Unanimity Procedure as a first example to this approach and showed that the Borda rule is the closest to unanimity under swap distance a.k.a the 2 distance. 3 shows that the Dodgson rule is the closest to Condorcet under swap distance. 4, 5 generalized this concept as distance-rationalizability, where being close is measured via various distance functions and with many concepts of consensus, e.g., unanimity, Condorcet etc. In this paper, we show that all non-degenerate scoring rules can be distance-rationalized as Closeness to Unanimity procedures under a class of weighted distance functions introduced in 6. Therefore, the results herein generalizes 1 and builds a connection between scoring rules and a generalization of the Kemeny distance, i.e. weighted distances.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) in its series Research Memorandum with number 068.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; Political Processes: Rent-seeking; Lobbying; Elections; Legislatures; and Voting Behavior; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances;
Other versions of this item:
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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