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Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of hamming type

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  • Edith Elkind

    ()

  • Piotr Faliszewski

    ()

  • Arkadii Slinko

    ()

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    Abstract

    In voting, the main idea of the distance rationalizability framework is to view the voters’ preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus. This approach, which is deeply rooted in the social choice literature, allows one to define (“rationalize”) voting rules via a consensus class of elections and a distance: a candidate is said to be an election winner if she is ranked first in one of the nearest (with respect to the given distance) consensus elections. It is known that many classic voting rules can be distance-rationalized. In this article, we provide new results on distance rationalizability of several Condorcet-consistent voting rules. In particular, we distance-rationalize the Young rule and Maximin using distances similar to the Hamming distance. It has been claimed that the Young rule can be rationalized by the Condorcet consensus class and the Hamming distance; we show that this claim is incorrect and, in fact, this consensus class and distance yield a new rule, which has not been studied before. We prove that, similarly to the Young rule, this new rule has a computationally hard winner determination problem. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

    Volume (Year): 39 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 4 (October)
    Pages: 891-905

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:4:p:891-905

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    1. Christian Klamler, 2005. "The Copeland rule and Condorcet’s principle," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 745-749, 04.
    2. Christian Klamler, 2005. "Borda and Condorcet: Some Distance Results," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 97-109, 09.
    3. Baigent, Nick, 1987. "Metric rationalisation of social choice functions according to principles of social choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 59-65, February.
    4. Young, H. P., 1977. "Extending Condorcet's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 335-353, December.
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