A Tale of Two Ports
AbstractThis paper examines how two geographically separated ports compete for a market consisting of manufacturing firms located between the two ports. There is a firm in each port, and these two firms, taking the infrastructure provided by their governments as given, compete in a Bertrand sense. The governments, however, can also compete in terms of investment in infrastructure. This paper shows that there are cases in which both the firm and the government in the port that has a longer history in the market may have the first mover advantage. In particular, the government can provide a credible threat by overinvesting in infrastructure. Nous analysons un jeu entre deux ports, dont le premier a l'avantage de prendre sa dÃ©cision avant son adversaire. Dans chaque port, il y a un cartel qui s'occupe de la distribution des biens produits par des Ã©tablissements localisÃ©s entre les deux ports. Les cartels prennent comme donnÃ©e l'infrastructure construite par les gouvernements respectifs qui se font concurrence. On dÃ©montre que l'un des deux gouvernements a intÃ©rÃªt Ã utiliser la stratÃ©gie de prÃ©emption en investissant trÃ¨s gÃ©nÃ©reusement en infrastructure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0037.
Date of creation: Aug 1999
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Ngo Van Long & Kar-yiu Wong, 2001. "A Tale of Two Ports," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-48, CIRANO.
- Ngo Van Long & Kar-yiu Wong, 1999. "A Tale of Two Ports," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0037, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
- R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy
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