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A Note on Optimal Care by Wealth-Constrained Injurers

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Author Info
Thomas J. Miceli (University of Connecticut)
Kathleen Segerson (University of Connecticut)

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Abstract

This paper clarifies the relationship between an injurer's wealth level and his care choice by highlighting the distinction between monetary and non-monetary care. When care is non-monetary, wealth-constrained injurers generally take less than optimal care, and care is increasing in their wealth level under both strict liability and negligence. In contrast, when care is monetary, injurers may take too much or too little care under strict liability, and care is not strictly increasing in injurer wealth. Under negligence, the relationship between injurer care and wealth is similar in the two formulations. However, when litigation costs are added to the model, the relationship between injurer care and wealth becomes non-monotonic under both liability rules.

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File URL: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2002-44.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2002-44.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2001
Date of revision: May 2002
Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2002-44

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Accident Law," NBER Working Papers 9694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Shavell, S., 1986. "The judgment proof problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-58, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hylton, Keith N., 1990. "The influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 161-171, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1988. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 151-64, January.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit de Geest, 2004. "When Will Judgment Proof Injurers Take Too Much Precaution?," Working Papers 04-27, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Tim Friehe, 2008. "On judgment proofness in the case of bilateral harm," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 175-185, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gerrit de Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2005. "Soft Regulators, Though Judges," Working Papers 05-06, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Tim Friehe, 2007. "A note on judgment proofness and risk aversion," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 109-118, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2004. "A Tort for Risk and Endogenous Bankruptcy," Working papers 2004-24, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, 2003. "Optimal Negligence Rule under Limited Liability," Economics Working Papers 759, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 2004. [Downloadable!]
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