Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs
AbstractThis paper explores the relationship between the structure of the market for the refining and distribution of gasoline and the wholesale price of unbranded gasoline sold to independent gasoline retailers. Theoretically, the effect of an increase in vertical integration is ambiguous because opposing forces act to increase and decrease wholesale prices. We empirically examine the effects of vertical and horizontal market structures on wholesale prices using both a broad panel and an event analysis. The panel covers twenty-six metropolitan areas from January 1993 through June 1997. The event is a merger of Tosco and Unocal in 1997 that changed the vertical and horizontal structure of thirteen West Coast metropolitan areas. Both data sets show that an increase in the degree of vertical integration is associated with higher wholesale prices.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Economics Working Papers with number E01-302Rev.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2001
Date of revision:
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Postal: University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA
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Other versions of this item:
- Richard Gilbert & Justine Hastings, 2002. "Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs," Industrial Organization 0201001, EconWPA.
- Gilbert, Richard & Hastings, Justine, 2001. "Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt3b7101mj, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Gilbert, Richard & Hastings, Justine, 2001. "Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6nf907n4, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L72 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-11-05 (All new papers)
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- Zava Aydemir & Stefan Buehler, 2002.
"Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply,"
0212, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute.
- BŸhler, Stefan & Zava Aydemir, 2003. "Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 33, Royal Economic Society.
- Erich J. Muehlegger, 2004. "Gasoline Price Spikes and Regional Gasoline Content Regulations - A Structural Approach," Working Papers 0421, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
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