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On the optimality of bargaining outcomes in the Collective-Particularistic multilateral bargaining game

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  • Daniel Cardona

    ()
    (Universitat de les Illes Balears)

  • Antoni Rubí-Barceló

    ()
    (Universitat de les Illes Balears)

Abstract

This note analyzes the efficiency properties of the equilibrium in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides a budget among collective and particularistic goods. We extend the model of Volden and Wiseman (2007) by considering smooth utility functions and consensus requirements ranging from simple-majority to unanimity. We show that when the private valuation of the private good is relatively high, only unanimity induces an (ex-ante) Pareto efficient outcome. Moreover, optimality can be easily attained by using sequential negotiations, independently of the majority requirement.

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Paper provided by Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada in its series DEA Working Papers with number 53.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:ubi:deawps:53

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Keywords: Non-cooperative bargaining; sequential negotiantion; voting; quota rules;

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  1. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, And Parliaments In Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967, August.
  2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 1998. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Working Papers 1036, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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