Horizontal and Vertical Social Preferences in Tournaments
AbstractMost studies find no collusion in tournaments. This result suggests that social preferences are irrelevant in this context. We investigate the impact of social preferences in a tournament using data from a laboratory experiment with two treatments. In a conentional tournament, an agent receives either the full prize or no prize at all. The other tournament provides the same incentives but the actual payment of an agent equals her expected payment. In both treatments the principal chooses between a fair and an unfair contract. Standard economic theory predicts the same effort provision in all situations. Our results show instead that envy between agents and the fairness of the principal determine the effectiveness of tournaments. Moreover, we observe that collusion between the agents and reciprocity towards the principal are mutually exclusive.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz in its series TWI Research Paper Series with number 48.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Tournament; Collusion; Envy; Agency problem; Reciprocity;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2010-01-10 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2010-01-10 (Microeconomics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Roman M. Sheremeta & William A. Masters & Timothy N. Cason, 2012. "Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: Theory and Experimental Results," Working Papers 12-04, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Magnus Hoffmann & Martin Kolmar, 2013. "Distributional Preferences in Probabilistic and Share Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 4184, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ulrich Wacker).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.