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Partisanship and the effectiveness of Fiscal Equalization: Evidence from French Municipalities

Author

Listed:
  • Touria Jaaidane

    (Université de Lille, LEM (UMR 9221))

  • Sophie Larribeau

    (Univ Rennes, CNRS, CREM - UMR 6211, F-35000 Rennes)

Abstract

We are interested in the effectiveness of the scal equalization system at the French municipal level. This system hinges on both vertical equalizing transfers from the State to the municipalities and horizontal equalization dened at the consolidated level (municipalities and the inter-municipal body they belong to). The transfer received by municipalities from the State, consisting of a lump-sum and an equalizing component, is formula-based. A whole set of criteria is used to dene its amount. An equalization fund is also used to redistribute resources horizontally, from the richest inter-municipal block entities to the poorest. Our main empirical results, using a large panel dataset of French municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants over the very recent period 2018-2022, are three-fold. We first find evidence for the role of the different criteria used to allocate the vertical transfer. Second, the equalization of tax capacities is operated mainly through the vertical transfer, as compared to the horizontal scheme whose performance is modest. We also find a number of dysfunctions in the equalization schemes, undermining their eectiveness. Third, we show that local politics comes into play and introduces partisanship in the allocation of the vertical transfer, which is at odds with the criteria-based rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Touria Jaaidane & Sophie Larribeau, 2023. "Partisanship and the effectiveness of Fiscal Equalization: Evidence from French Municipalities," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 2023-01, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    • Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:2023-01
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal equalization; Inter-governmental transfers; Local governments; Inter-municipal cooperation; Partisanship; RDD;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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